Sunday, September 17, 2006

Kleptocracy and Mancur Olson's books

Looking for the etymology of 'kleptocracy', excessive rent-seeking by those with political power, one source said that it originated in Spain 1819, during the Napoleonic invasions?

Anyway, the growth of the idea of kleptocracy seems to be attributable to the economist Mancur Olson, especially in his last book Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships:
"A central strand is the nature of political power, and how different kinds of power promote different kinds of economic behaviour...Through history, Olson observes, it has been better to live under political tyranny than to be subject to the depredations of roving bands of warrior-thieves...Assuming that tyrants and thieves are alike, in that they are out for whatever they can extract from their subjects, why should one kind of predation be better than the other? The answer, Olson explains, is that the tyrant has a stake, an "encompassing interest", in the domain he is exploiting: if it prospers, he can extract more for himself in taxes and other ways. A roving bandit merely destroys and moves on. A stationary bandit keeps taxes low in the short term in order to spur growth and gather more revenue later; in fact he goes further, and provides growth-promoting public goods, the better to improve his take...Autocracy, then, is usually much better for the victims than anarchy."
Peaceful, settled rule by political elites, even they extract excessive economic rents, is better than a continual, endemic state of warfare and feuding.

Olson also addreses democracy, which I filed away for my work interest in FDI in emerging economies, but I write papers on early modern political history and warfare, so I found this discussion particularly interesting.

Found a reflective essay on the meaning of the term as well as the interesting, but rather pessimistic "Iron Law of Oligarchy", which "states that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic or autocratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies."

Examples from Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel

Jared Diamond's "Guns, Germs, and Steel" chapter on "Kleptocracy" is a good intro to history of non-western political economy and the Maori invasion of Chatham Island is a memorable example of the collision of whole socio-political systems. This book was useful teaching 100 sophomore non-native English speakers in a Thai university economic history since there is a translation in Thai that can be read in parallel.

This newly coined word "Kleptocracy" seems to have been the inspiration behind Acemoglu paper: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule (The Alfred Marshall Lecture) Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier April 2004, Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, v.2, 162-192

Brad DeLong's blog today showed how a fantastically inclusive course that includes everything an informed undergraduate should understand can be transformed by the brutish bigotry of conservative journalism. Self-reinforcing idiocy at the Weekly Standard cited the names of courses without the content of the courses to make them sound ridiculous. To anyone with some knowledge who probes a little, the conservative journalists are the ones who end up sounding completely ridiculous. William Kristol, editor and founder of the Weekly Standard, teaches a course on intellectual history at Harvard and he allows this sort of ridiculous article as editor? What a charade! Someone should call him to task on it.

Literary intellectuals and hypocrisy

From Brad DeLong's blog, nobel prize winning writer Gunter Grass is an ex-nazi and hypocrite.

Hypocrisy and self-contradiction, just another trope on the literary intellectual's palette?

Actually, distortion of historical truth, or at least the mangling of historical truth, is just another higher order truth to be untangled from the historical record. Deconstructionists will, in turn, be deconstructed. A thread of intellectual history yet to be written.

To be fair, the Gunter Grass problem is a problem with history in every culture. In post-WWII Malaysia and Singapore "the problem of 'collaboration' stood in the way of a full reckoning, and the needs of nationhood often demanded amnesia." (Forgotten Armies: Britain's Asian Empire and the War with Japan, 2004, p. 329) See 'War and Memory in Singapore and Malaysia' (2000).

More support for Rankean "what actually happened" in historiography.

Moment of self-reflective terminological angst

I can already see a problem with the dichotomisation western vs. non-western applied to warfare, politics, or economics. This distinction has a tendency to attribute suboptimal or bad features to the non-western world and optimal 'good' features like democracy, modern technology, and rationalised and fair social institutions to the western world. But that's not what I had in mind.

What I had in mind was drawing attention to a deficit in research and knowledge on the non-western world and the qualitative differences with the west, particularly in the pre-modern era. Whereas the classical Greek and Roman periods have been intensively studied in the west, serious attention to these periods reached a nadir in the colonial period, but this scholarship is embedded in a now discredited colonial approach to the subject matter. New work needs to be done.

In fact, I would eschew much standard terminology such as "democracy" for the idea of "participation" (participation, legality/constitutionality, transparency) because as most people point out places like South Korea or Thailand have democracy, but a home-grown democracy that differs in substantial ways from western democracy practiced in Europe, the US, and Australia. Many point out that longstanding traditional village governance, headmanship, has a high degree of participation (with varying degress of coercive consensus making that violate our notions of democracy).

Saturday, September 16, 2006

Economist Avner Greif's theory of endogenous institutional change

Read "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change" by Greif and Laitin last night.

This paper just rang with application to historical data as I read it. The self-enforcing nature of institutions, positive and negative feedback, feedback diagrams, and even human agency has a place in this model. Is it useful The question is whether the model is useful when applied without mathematics to make sense of history, of elite contention for resources. Only one example is presented in any detail. This is a dense paper that requires many readings to make sense of, but the pay-off in deeper understanding of superficial historical data promises to be great.

Other recent Stanford working papers by Greif:

Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade

Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: The European Experience

Avner Greif's personal homepage has additional texts:

Avner Greif and David D. Laitin -- A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change

1. Introduction to book on institutional economics of medieval trade

2. "Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange" from the "Handbook of New Institutional Economics"

Friday, September 15, 2006

Small divergences, then larger ones, then the "great divergence"

If in history the body of the dog is the facts and the tail is the generalization we reach from them, then should the tail be wagging the dog as it often does when historians jump straight into and devote inordinate amounts of time to artificially constructed "great debates".

I would argue that in a history course, and more specifically in an economic history course, large unresolved questions or issues around which debates still swirl should be avoided in favor of detailed case studies from which limited, humble yet powerful generalisations can be made. In other words, teach students the limits of analysis. How to formulate and test small hypotheses and how to, step by step, move from these to larger more inclusive hypotheses.

What I am thinking about here, is life outside of academia. Contrast, for instance, Wolfowitz's promise of quick success in the Iraq War, avoiding Colin Powell with his more experienced Edmund Burke-like "break it you buy it" pottery barn rule, and war correspondent, historian, and British conservative Sir Max Hasting's take on the Iraq war:
The madness of Bush's policy is that he has made a wilful choice to amalgamate the grossly irrational, totalitarian and homicidal objectives of al-Qaida with the just claims of Palestinians and grievances of Iraqis. His remarks on Saturday invite Muslims who sympathise with Hamas or reject Iraq's occupation or merely aspire to grow opium in Afghanistan to make common cause with Bin Laden.

If the United States insists upon regarding all Muslim opponents of its foreign policies as a homogeneous enemy then that is what they become. The Muslim radicals' "single narrative" portrays the entire course of history as a Christian and Jewish plot against Islam.

It is widely agreed among western governments and intelligence agencies that, in order to defeat the pernicious spread of such nonsense, a convincing counter-narrative is needed. Yet it becomes a trifle difficult to compose this when the US president promulgates his own single narrative, almost as ridiculous as that of al-Qaida. (Source: Brad DeLong's Blog)
What I would not teach is the "great divergence" even though it seems to be mandatory now, namely why did the west have the "industrial revolution" while the non-western world was left to play a game of economic catch up? Comments in a Perdue paper provide a little support for this view.
"Writing and teaching world history is not easy. Unavoidably, we must simplify the story by knitting together a few strands of the voluminous historical record. Anyone who tries to draw such a grand picture deserves respect. There is nothing wrong per se with thinking big. But large-scale explanatory schemes are fraught with dangers. Too often the big thinkers merely repeat old stereotypes held by eighteenth and nineteenth century Europeans about classical Asian civilizations. Tired cliches are dressed up as new theories, ignoring recent research."

"A central question for European historians is the origin of the Industrial Revolution. For China, the inverse question is often raised: why did imperial China 'stagnate', or fail to break through to sustained industrial growth by 1800, when it had led the world in economic dynamism and technological innovation at least up to 1200 CE? Both of these questions have generated a great deal
of discussion. We are plagued, however, by 'fast-food' explanations which attempt to take a shortcut through complex empirical and theoretical issues." (Source: China in the Early Modern World: Shortcuts, Myths and Realities Education About Asia, Summer, 1999. Peter C. Perdue)
How could a short survey course provide more than a 'fast food explanation' without almost exlcusively focusing on the problem to the exclusion of everything else, like the western media often does in so-called Media Circuses when it latches on to one story to the exclusion of all else. This mentality does seem to affect academia sometimes. For instance, the Anthropology of War course at MIT, instead of poking around and searching under less visited rocks to expand our corpus of historical knowledge (e.g. the Maori Musket Wars, technological transfer fuelling expansionary warfare), the course chooses to focus exclusively on the Iraq War, as if the rest of the world will not be equally as relevant one day in the future.

Perdue's paper warns us not to enter historical texts with preconceived conclusions. The late nineteenth century sugar industry is used as an example:
"Thus the technological changes in the sugar industry had little or nothing to do with the relative price of labor, but a lot to do with the action of the two states. The colonial Japanese state could enforce social changes that supported a total system of industrial production, from the field to the factory to the ports, but the weakened Qing empire, despite its efforts at self-strengthening, had the will but not the strength to direct change."
Severely dichotomized debates like the "great divergence debate" if they soak too much in the way of pedagogical and research resources can be counterproductive.

Non-western economic history I

Great thread at Brad DeLong's blog on non-western economic history. Threads like this really provide the motivation to write good economic history of Burma-Yunnan-bay of Bengal (c. 1350-1600). Couldn't resist making an obnoxiously long (but not obnoxious, I hope) comment:

>>Colin Danby: "Can anyone suggest long-scale economic histories of mainland and/or island Southeast Asia?"

Victor Lieberman (2003) Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Cambridge University Press covers 1000 years and references all relevant literature. Lieberman also employs the three way model of Smithian, Schumpeterian, and Solovian growth of Joel Mokyr, The Levers of Riches. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

>>Ari Levine; "Timothy Brook's _Confusions of Pleasure_ is more a cultural history of commercialization."

Which makes it very relevant to the Thorstein Veblen conspicuous consumption threads on professor DeLong's blog recently. Much of these luxury goods came from the Tai ethnic regions on the border of Southeast Asia in Yunnan, covered in:
Sun, Laichen. (2000) Ming-Southeast Asian overland interactions, c. 1368-1644. PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Also, the management of China's northern enemies over thousands of years has an economic dimension to it. Arthur Waldron's "The Great Wall of China from History to Myth" covers "trade or raid" and Di Cosmo's online paper below covers the public finance transition from raiding to tribute to settled taxation which leads to the issues of land settlement and peasant mobility, good focal points for cross-cultural comparison: Di Cosmo, Nicola.(1999) “State Formation and Periodization in
Inner Asian History,” Journal of World History, 10:1 (Spring, 1999): 1-40.

Personally, analyzing the dynamics of pre-modern non-western economies on their own terms like Lieberman's book above is going to do more to enlighten students about how non-western economic (and political) systems are radically different and how naive solutions (like transform Iraq into American democracy in 90 days or less) are bound to fail. Better, that is, than broad questions like the Pomeranz what caused the "great divergence" question. Anthony Reid eventually backed off trying to apply a similar broad European-derived thesis (the "17th century crisis") from insular to mainland Southeast Asian history when Lieberman challenged him, see p. 9:
IMHO the beauty of historical work lies in the details, although it would be nice to see economic theory like Avner Greif's information economics explain more history.

>>Colin Danby: "It would be great if someone could post recommended readings on East Africa's role in the Indian Ocean economy."

Malyn Newitt (1995) A History of Mozambique, Indiana University Press
Covers Portuguese settlement and trade plus climate constraints on ocean travel and trade.

Thursday, September 14, 2006

Pre-World War II immigration in the British empire

The pre-World War II Indian immigration into Burma has always perplexed me.

One the one hand I have met so many Indians who were affected by the post-war backlash against them in Burma. For example, rice mills and property seized and are not recognized as full Burmese citizens. There is a standard condemning story about chettiar money lenders that Michael Adas's book counteracts to a certain extent:

Adas, Michael. The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice. Frontier, 1852-1941. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1974. .

Wouldn't an economist argue that the Burmese as a whole benefited from flows of Indian labor and capital into Burma before the war? Reading this recent book really threw this belief into question:

Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia 1941-1945 (2004) by Christopher Bayly,Tim Harper.

This book looks like only a military history, but it is actually a panoramic social history of the pre-World War II British Empire in Southeast Asia too. It certainly sheds a different, more sinister light on the British empire than, for instance, Niall Ferguson's book.

This book is a near perfect history book. It is well written in an engaging style that has made it very popular. The book is built upon original primary archival sources such as memoirs which make it original, not just another rehash of secondary sources. It combines multiple perspectives from the high level governor or viceroy to the coolies at the waterfront. It gives you a better idea of the impact of war on society as a whole than any other book that I've read.

This book is also a sobering story of free flowing immigration in the British Empire on the eve of of World War II. It shows some of the chaos that this freedom for all to immigrate led to. Massive Indian immigration into Burma overwhelmed the local population, displacing them with cheap labor. In the agricultural sector money lenders foreclosed and seized land, the Japanese invaded, the Indians fled, and a dependence on Burmese rice to the tune of 15% in Bengal contributed to a famine, 3 million people died, who had specialized in jute production before the war. Can one fully predict exogenous shocks? The pre-empire social formations were probably more resilient to them.

The British empire seems to be a test case in many respects for all the arguments of market liberalisation that the discipline of economics presents, such as freedom of immigration.

Thursday, September 07, 2006

Open Source GIS: OSGEO.ORG

Learned about new open source GIS software for map making from an IT writer at my newspaper today. Quite exciting for me since geography is essential to get a handle on the history of Burma-Yunnan-Bay of Bengal (c. 1350-1600).

1. OSGEO.ORG is offering the open source GIS software.

2. Here is the GIS blog Between the Poles of Geoff Zeiss who works for Autodesk working on the project somehow.

3. Also found this open source GIS resource list.

Anyway, one these days, soon, supporting written history with maps will be a lot easier.

Tuesday, September 05, 2006

Models for academic history journals (+ supporting materials)

This journal of Tibetan history, religion, and culture is a model for journals devoted to Burmese history or that of ethnic minorities in Southeast Asia like the Tai or Mon.

The format of the articles with abstract and footnotes is nice and uniform and could be easily emulated with Wikipedia fitted with appropriate templates. The site also has nice reference materials such as a primary source document collection, maps, and gazeteer.

OpenCourseWare Consortium

Free Access to Open Materials for Teaching, Learning and Research, Supported by The William & Flora Hewlett Foundation.

List of open access academic journal resources.

Friday, September 01, 2006

Mong Mao: Mandala, Galactic Polity, or Solar Polity?

One of three metaphors for political organisation, mandala, galactic polity, or solar polity, might lead to making sense of Mong Mao's history.

It always seemed to me that the use of the concept "mandala" in pre-colonial Southeast Asian history seemed to reduce the complexity of history, the interplay of strategic human agency and more fixed, long-term, deterministic structures, that one finds in well-written narrative histories, to a simple concept, a much too simple concept.

I've grown to appreciate the concept recently, and understand how some historians such as Sunait Chutintaranond, Thongchai Winichakul, and Martin Stuart-Fox have used the idea to pick apart received traditions about unified and centralized rule in their respective time periods and regions.

Sometimes the best way to gain an appreciation of an idea is to go through the laborious process of solving the problem that the idea was created as a solution to. After rereading Martin Stuart-Fox's history of Laos (see bibliography below) that uses the concept of Mandala extensively, I realized that the concept probably applies to nearby Mong Mao also. Furthermore, I read Chris Baker's paper that argues that the northern provinces of Ayutthaya were largely independent of the Ayutthayan center even into the period of Burmese invasions of the 16th century, but when I read Sunait Chutintaranond's paper, I realized that Sunait had already shown how "mandala" was the solution to this problem.

The world historian and historian of Burma Victor Lieberman's rejection of the term mandala in lieu of "solar polity" , "galactic polity" being yet another possible metaphor, is particularly instructive.

I still think that narrative history that closely follows primary sources is the best way to capture the interplay between strategic human action and long-term social and environmental factors in human and plan to follow this course in future research. General models that have been highlighted by Lieberman's Strange Parallels recently, including Gerschenkron's collective problems and advantages to backwardness, O'Connor's agricultural succession in Southeast Asia, and a general political anthropology approach, can clarify and highlight important themes in this narrative (without imputing abolute causal relations of different factors where multicausal factors is the norm).

Anyway, I've been slowly revising the Wikipedia page devoted to "Mandala (Southeast Asian history)". Here are my contributions to-date:

Mandala (Southeast Asian history)

Mandala means "circle of kings". The mandala is a model for describing the patterns of diffuse political power in early Southeast Asian history. The concept of a mandala counteracts our natural tendency to look for the unified political power of later history, the power of large kingdoms and nation states, in earlier history where local power is more important. In the words of O.W. Wolters who originated the idea in 1982:
"The map of earlier Southeast Asia which evolved from the prehistoric networks of small settlements and reveals itself in historical records was a patchwork of often overlapping mandalas"[1]
In some ways similar to the feudal system of Europe, states were linked in overlord-tributary relationships. Compared to feudalism however, the system gave greater independence to the subordinate states; it emphasised personal rather than official or territorial relationships; and it was often non-exclusive. Any particular area, therefore, could be subject to several powers or none.

Intersecting mandalas circa 1360: from north to south Lan Xang, Lanna, Sukhothai, Ayutthaya and Angkor.


The term draws a comparison with the mandala of the Hindu and Buddhist worldview; the comparison emphasises the radiation of power from each power centre, as well as the non-physical basis of the system.

Other metaphors such as Tambiah's original idea of a "galactic polity" [2], describe similar political patterns as the mandala. The metaphor of a "solar polity" is preferred by the historian of Southeast Asia Victor Lieberman because in the solar system there is one central body, the sun, and the components or planets of the solar system can be fully enumerated, unlike galaxies. [3]


....The historian Stuart-Fox uses the term "mandala" extensively to describe the history of the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang as a structure of loosely held together "meuang" that disintegrated after Lan Xang's conquest by Siam starting in the 18th century [5]

The Thai historian Sunait Chutintaranond made an important contribution to study of the mandala in Southeast Asian history by demonstrating that "three assumptions responsible for the view that Ayudhya was a strong centralized state" did not hold and that "in Ayudhya the hegemony of provincial governors was never successfully eliminated" [6]....


Chutintaranond, Sunait, "Mandala, segmentary state, and Politics of Centralization in Medieval Ayudhya," Journal of the Siam Society 78, 1, 1990, p. 1.

Lieberman, Victor Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Stuart-Fox, Martin, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline, White Lotus, 1998.

Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, Cambridge, 1976.
Thongchai Winichakul. Siam Mapped. University of Hawaii Press, 1984. ISBN 0-8248-1974-8

Wolters, O.W. History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. ISBN 0-87727-725-7

Wolters, O.W. History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Revised Edition, 1999.

1. O.W. Wolters, 1999, p. 27
2. Tambiah, 1976, ch. 7, cited in Lieberman, 2003, p. 33
3. Lieberman, 2003, p. 33
4. O.W. Wolters, 1999, pp. 27-40, 126-154
5. Martin-Fox, 1998, pp. 14-15
6. O.W. Wolters, pp. 142-143 citing Chutintaranond, 1990, pp. 97-98

Thursday, August 31, 2006

Google to the rescue!
(Google island/library of orphaned books)

Google is creating a library of books with expired copyrights!

Google has realised that books with expired copyrights are a goldmine of information.

Allow me to be Nostradamus for a moment and predict that this move might shift the global techntonic publishing plates and convince the paper obsessed that it's time to change and focus on computer readable books (which you can publish in smaller increments and revise without acknowledging the embarassing fact that you wasted paper the first time round). Once computer readable books overtake paper, the next step is express printing of very limited paper editions, because we still can't lug an expensive computer whereever we go, for instance, to a picnic in the park, without our wives rightly being angry at us for spoiling the picnic. (But we can bring a handheld)

The first thing that came to mind, rather strangely, was the island of misfit toys in the Christmas Special Rudolf the Rednosed Reindeer. Perhaps my brain needs rewiring! Actually, the brain apparently remembers more about this childhood classic then the conscious mind does:
"When there is a strong fog, Santa relies on Rudolph as a beacon, and Rudolph gets them to the Island of Misfit Toys and at the end, the toys are given homes (they are dropped out of the sleigh behind the credits via umbrellas)."

Read The Guardian

Read ZDNet

The Guardian really captures the relevance of this revolutionary move. As a denizen (actually "intense user" is more appropriate since I don't sleep in the library) of U.C. Berkeley's library when I am in the United States, I realize you have to actually stroll through the stacks to understand the vast store of untapped knowledge waiting there to be liberated:
Google says it aims to make the world's books "discoverable online" by offering both well known classics and obscure titles on every conceivable subject. The search engine's foray into the world of books has riled publishers around the world but the company's academic backers were keen to stress yesterday that it had been misunderstood.
Reg Carr, director of Oxford University's Bodleian Library, a partner in the project, said it would open up the world of literature and make available more obscure titles such as scientific tracts and long-forgotten poetry from the 18th century.

"Public domain books, long out of copyright and seen only by the fortunate few in the great research libraries of the world, are about to come out of the closet in their millions and into the homes of internet users all over the world."

Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Acemoglu: Gerschenkron's successor

Bumped into the work of Daron Acemoglu who won the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal while I was searching for material on Gerschenkron Gerschenkron was the great 20th-century scholar of economic development and
Acemoglu is the Gerschenkron of present-day economics. Gerschenkron was once cited by Subrahmanyam as being relevant to the "backward" Tai hinterlands of western mainland Southeast Asia (aka Burma aka Myanmar). Acemoglu may be someone with relevance to premodern political economy of mainland Southeast Asia. Can't even access his Wikipedia page, so here is the mirror from In "Why not a Political Coase Theorem" he argues that in politics the Coase Theorem breaks down due to commitment problems. "A Theory of Political Transitions"
(Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson September 2001, American Economic Review, volume 91, pp 938-963) sounds like it might address political succession, mathematically I hope. The paper "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule" (Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier April 2004, forthcoming, Journal of the European Economic Association) looks like it might be relevant, since divide and rule is so frequently cited as a method of governance in mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan. A lot of his papers are online. Here is the blurb from his new book Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Dec 2005):
"This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization."

Clearly, relevant to Burma. There is also a good description on his John Bates Clark Medal page. Here are some interesting extracts from an online review:

Extracted from: The Man Who Succeeded Gerschenkron

[Link to whole article]
"...Mathematization conquered the core of economics in the years before, during and after World War II. Then, both because of the power of formal reasoning and the prestige they conferred, those who espoused formal methods tackled the applied fields, one after the other. The mathematizers were not welcomed like so many liberators; acceptance was often grudging."

"Moreover, as mathematical technique was brought to bear, a reduction in detail took place. New insights were more easily transferred from field to field; new tools could be deployed quickly. But the study of institutions, which before mathematization had loomed so large, gradually was eclipsed..."

"...Hence the image of an hourglass that had been suggested by his colleague Paul Romer, with the scope or breadth of topical economics (on the horizontal axis), plotted against time (on the vertical axis). As the language of economics is unified, a dramatic narrowing of topical concerns takes place -- followed in turn by a commensurate widening, as speakers of the language learn to tackle topics that they had been temporarily unable to address. Kreps ventured in 1997, "É[T]he field now seems to be returning to something like the breadth of the discipline before World War II..."

"...He [Gerschenkron] had one big idea, and he made the most of it: the advantages of backwardness in economic development."

"Thorstein Veblen had said as much in telegraphic form in 1915 in Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution: late-adopters could sometimes move out to the frontiers of development more easily than the pioneers of the industrial revolution. Gerschenkron now made various forms of slow economic development his specialty. He himself, with his late start, having had to learn to work in two new languages as an adult, exemplified the possibilities. "The more backward a country," he wrote, "the more complex and exciting its industrial history.""

"...Yale's William Parker said, "The resounding theses of Gerschenkron tell the size and shape and weave of the stockings the family hangs out on Christmas eve, but say nothing of when or why Santa Claus comes down the chimney")...

"...Daron Acemoglu's good fortune was to graduate from the University of York at the very moment that the hourglass of development economics was at its narrowest, when all the complications of economic growth had been briefly reduced to an argument about the causes of "technical change.""

"Like Gerschenkron, Acemoglu had been raised in a developing society -- in Istanbul, a Turk of Armenian descent. His father was a professor of law, later an attorney for banks and corporations. Political economy and development strategy came naturally to the dinner table."

"But his parents died when Acemoglu was in his teens. Political science at York disappointed him; he switched to economics instead. And when MIT admitted him to graduate school but failed to offer a scholarship, he did his doctorate at the London School of Economics instead, writing a dissertation on a variety of labor and macroeconomic topics. A year later, MIT hired him to teach -- an intriguing but unknown quantity at whom they wanted a closer look. Four years later they gave him tenure. He added dual citizenship as well."

"The committee that gave the 38-year-old Acemoglu the Clark medal last week described him as "extremely broad and productive," noting that in the course of a dozen years he had made significant contributions to the study of labor markets before moving on to "especially innovative" ideas about the role of institutions in development and political economy."

"In fact, it was a series of investigations in the history of the European colonization of much of the rest of the world, beginning in the 15th century, that made Acemoglu's reputation, demonstrating that institutions of various sorts were more important to development than economists previously had thought. The "rules of the game" -- the structure of property rights, the presence of markets, and their various frictions, the form that governments take -- are key determinants of what happens next, Acemoglu showed, in some unusually inventive and convincing ways."

"Take the rise of Europe in the first place. The importance of the Atlantic trade had long been noted, and various reasons for it advanced. With Simon Johnson of MIT's Sloan School and James Robinson of the University of California at Berkeley, Acemoglu argued in "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth" that England and the Netherlands leapt out front because a newly emergent merchant class benefited most from trade -- and was able to successfully demand institutions to protect their property and commerce. In contrast, although they had been the first to discover the richest lands, Spain and Portugal stagnated because their monarchies had managed to capture the early returns, they argued -- and thus were able to thwart their merchants' drive for power."

"In "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," Acemoglu and Robinson argued that political elites can be expected to pursue "blocking" strategies when innovation threatens their monopolies and when there is little threat to their power from politics. External threats reduced the temptation to block, they found -- producing a model that suggested why Britain, German and the United States had industrialized during the 19th century, while the landed aristocracies in Russia and Austria-Hungary sought to hold back the tide."

[Niall Ferguson in Colossus has a nice overview of this in his coverage of post-WWII Japanese and German development]

"In "Reversal of Fortune," Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argued that colonial powers pursued very different strategies in different lands, with fateful consequences. In rich and densely populated countries such as Mexico and Peru, they extracted wealth; in poor and sparsely settled countries such as British North America and Argentina, they encouraged investment."

"And in "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development" they inventively teased evidence from differing mortality rates faced by Europeans in different countries of how the choices made in those circumstanced gave rise to different institutions and so to different development paths."

"The Clark committee noted that some of the methods and conclusions were still being debated -- but that a broad and substantial rethinking of the development process was underway no matter what. The appearance this summer of Acemoglu's book with Robinson, The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy will stimulate much further discussion. The MIT course that he teaches with fellow professor Abhijit Bannerjee on development issues is routinely oversubscribed. And a long list of projects underway testifies to his staying power."

Monday, August 28, 2006

Last British ambassador to Burma calls for comparative research

The Burmese Patient
By Vicky Bowman, British ambassador to Myanmar (2002-2006)
August 2006

Analyzes the current state of economic and political development within Burma using a analogy of disease and treatment of disease. A very balanced assessment and call for more research on Burmese politics and economic development using comparisons with Chile, Vietnam, China, Thailand and Korea.

How a study of pathology helps in an assessment of a sick nation’s problems

"Regardless of the motivation or qualifications of those prescribing the medicine, the main thing to remember is that our goal should be the Burmese patient’s sustainable recovery. This was brought home to me by a presentation at a recent Burma Day conference in Brussels, where one activist produced graphs to show that the campaign objectives of his organization had been increasingly achieved year-on-year. Yet the rest of us at the conference, Burmese and non-Burmese alike, had been standing around the patient’s bed all day unanimously agreeing that he had never looked in a worse state of health."

"It would be a mistake to believe that there can be a miracle or rapid cure. Many other less developed and even better developed countries suffer from the same symptoms as Burma, such as poverty, corruption, inequality, unsustainable natural resource exploitation, lack of freedom, and a growing burden of HIV. Many countries are sicker than Burma on some or all of these counts. Treatment for systemic problems is never straightforward..."

"So we need more research, and more evaluation. In particular, we should review how countries such as Chile, Vietnam, China, Thailand and Korea recovered (or are recovering) from military and one-party dictatorship, and consider the relevance of that experience to Burma. And policies, whether they are implemented by the Burmese government, the international community, opposition or exiles; whether mass planting of physic nut bodies, banking sanctions, or banning ethnic languages from the primary school curriculum, should be openly and honestly evaluated for their short and long-term impacts and effectiveness. Lack of accountability is a big problem inside the country, but it is also a problem with the opposition and exiles. Audit should also include lessons to be learned from success stories, such as the shift in government attitudes to HIV/AIDS, and the boom in beans and pulse exports which has benefited dry zone farmers. In the latter case, an unusually laissez faire approach by the government, which allowed farmers to grow crops freely and respond to market mechanisms and incentives, supported by a domestic banking infrastructure which facilitates the work of brokers across the country, were key factors promoting economic growth....

...Full organ transplantation is a risky last resort. So more needs to be done to heal and strengthen Burma’s existing internal organs such as the education system, the judiciary and the police, through a diet of capacity-building. Unhealthily enlarged organs, such as the military, need to be reduced to the correct size so that they function more efficiently. And the backbone of civil society needs to be strengthened.

Pathology derives from the Greek word pathos, which means "suffering, feeling, emotion." These are common feelings for all who work to try and bring about change in Burma. But I believe we need to put emotions aside, and take a dispassionate look at the evidence, and draw appropriate conclusions.

Sunday, August 27, 2006

Marx is intellectual history

Brad DeLong's blog makes some trenchant criticisms of Marx and Marxists and relegates it to "intellectual history" where it clearly belongs. Once again, I can't resist adding my two cents. I respect Marx as an important part of history, but his ideas resemble someone on hallucinogens. I remember in the German Ideology, his leisurely ideas about labour, fishing in the morning, tending cows in the afternoon,.....I found this very attractive when I was a freshman at university.

Introducing Serious, Permanent Bugs into Your Wetware

From Brad DeLong's blog:

"we find Michael Fitzgerald, a man who has seriously misprogrammed substantial chunks of his frontal lobes by reading Karl Marx's Capital--something that, I am becoming convinced, should only be done by somebody with immunity to the mental virus--by a trained intellectual or social or economic historian, or by a trained neoclassical economist....

Where does one begin? Let me make two observations only:

First, I observe that the idea that the best way to understand the political economy of the 1970s is through intensive, group, line-by-line study of an unfinished, inconsistent, and ambiguous text first drafted in the 1850s by a very smart, sometimes far-sighted, but definitely not divine human being--that that idea is already a delusion peculiar to those who were a little too good in school in seeking truths from reading books rather than seeking truths from facts.

Second, I observe that Marx's claim that the "twofold character of the commodity, as use-value and exchange-value," is a difficulty in need of "exploration" is a claim that can only be made by a deranged Hegelian mystic. Consider the following thought experiment:

Suppose that at my left hand I had a fresh-cooked hard-shell lobster and a lobster cracker. The lobster cracker would have a lot of use value to me right now: If I didn't have one, then half an hour from now my hands would be bleeding and cut--something I would rather avoid. I would be glad that I had it. But the lobster cracker would have little exchange-value: nobody nearby would exchange for it, would trade for it, anything I would particularly need or want.

Suppose that at my right hand I had a financial portfolio long the shares of residential construction companies, and short mortgage-backed securities. At the moment share of residential construction companies are low, but mortgage default premia are also low. If the shares of residential construction companies are fairly priced, than housing construction and housing prices are in free-fall, defaults on mortgages will rise, and the prices on mortgage-backed securities will fall as well--producing profits on the short position. If mortgage-backed securities are fairly priced, then defaults on mortgages will stay low and housing prices and construction will stay healthy, in which case shares of residential construction companies are underpriced--and there are profits to be expected from the long position. Such a portfolio would have no use-value at all. But it could well--if one could get the hedge ratios right--turn out to have a mighty exchange value, in the sense that other people would be willing to exchange for it, to trade for it, a lot of things I would like to have.

What's the mystery here? What's in need of "exploration"? Things are useful for two reasons (A) Because their physical nature is such that you find them directly useful--that's use value. (b) Because we live in a society in which other people will trade you things for them, things that you can use--that's exchange value. This is not hard to grasp. This is not particularly subtle.

Fitzgerald says that Marx's analysis of use-value and exchange-value "reveal[s] in an elementary form the contradictory character of capitalist production" which requires the abolition of private property and market exchange in order for the "mystical veil" of market prices to be stripped off "the life process of material production" and "production by freely associated men... consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan." In what sense is this dual role of commodities a "contradiction"? Marx never offered me a coherent answer. And Fitzgerald does no better. How would eliminating markets and prices help resolve this "contradiction"? That was never explained either

Moreover, in Fitzgerald's phrase "the contradictory character of capitalist production," the adjective "capitalist" is incorrect. A moment's look back at history reveals that the distinction between use-value and exchange-value is not something invented by or peculiar to the capitalist mode of production: it is found in all human societies, no matter how large or small.

The cattle slaughtered and cooked by the thralls of Hrothgar, King of the Geats, have use-value to Hrothgar: He and his family can eat (some of) them. The cattle have exchange-value to Hrothgar as well: He feeds them to his warriors at their nightly banquets in his great hall of Heorot. In exchange for livery and maintenance, the warriors fight Hrothgar's wars. Success in war gains Hrothgar more thralls, more cattle, and a bigger and better reputation as a great Drighten.

If you try to ground an analysis of capitalism-in-particular on a feature (the distinction between objects' direct usefulness and their role in social processes of reciprocity, redistribution, or market exchange) that capitalism shares with every other human social system--well, you won't get anywhere. And those who read Capital "in a group, out loud, line by line, paragraph by paragraph... discussing and arguing over every page, through volumes one, two and three, even unto Theories of Surplus Value" don't get anywhere at all."

My Comment: This sort of Marxist textual study really reminds me of bible study, which might be a good way to gain solidarity and power, something that conservatives seem to be a lot better at, but works against exactly what liberals do best, **questioning the existing order**, to the extent that liberals become doctrinaire, they don't seem to really be liberals anymore (Niall Ferguson in Colossus dares to question the liberal status quo though)

"Intellectual history" seems exactly the right way to read Marx along with the intellectuals who took him too seriously to the point of avoiding obvious signs that all was not what it was cracked up to be in Stalinist Russia (see Simone de Beauvoir's diaries or "Les Mandarins" including fights with a drunk Koestler).

The intellectual history of Marx and Marxists is still at the root of a lot of important ideas in the social sciences like the materialist conception of history, base-superstructure, Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses, modes of production and the origins of the state, but so is Edmund Burke whose ideas can be seen in the important role Japanese era elites played in post-WWII South Korean economic history for instance. One of the reason's I enjoy reading Brad DeLong's blog is its pulling apart of the strong associations between economics and conservatism, at least here in Asia.

Thursday, August 17, 2006

Mong Mao: The multiple senses of the toponym

Below is copy of the Wikipedia article in which I try to make clear what Mong Mao means. I am just trying to make clear the different ways that people use the often ambiguous, or at least multi-sensed, term "Mong Mao".

Mong Mao

Mong Mao was an ethnically Tai state that controlled several smaller Tai states or chieftainships along the frontier of what is now Myanmar and China in the De-hong region of Yunnan with a capital near the modern-day border town of Ruili. The name of the main river in this region is named the Nam Mao River also know as the Shweli River.

The chronicle of this region, which was written much later, was named the Mong Mao Chronicle. [1]

Mong Mao arose in the power vaccuum left after the Kingdom of Dali in Yunnan fell to the Mongols around 1254. This kingdom had asserted some unity over the diversity of ethnic groups residing along the southwest frontier of Yunnan. (Daniels, 2006, 28)

"Mong Mao" is sometimes used by authors to refer to the entire group of Tai states along the Chinese-Myanmar frontier including Luchuan-Pingmian, Mong Yang (Chinese: Meng Yang), and Hsenwi (Chinese: Mu Bang), even though specific place names are almost always used in Ming and Burmese sources.

The center of power shifted frequently between these different places. Sometimes these were unified under one strong leader, sometimes they were not. As the Shan scholar Sai Kam Mong observes: "Sometimes one of these strove to be the leading kingdom and sometimes all of them were unified into one single kingdom...The capital of the kingdom shifted from place to place, but most of them were located near the Nam Mao [river] (the "Shweli" on most maps today)" [2]

The various versions of the Mong Mao Chronicle provide the lineage of Mong Mao rulers. The Shan chronicle tradition recorded very early and roughly by Elias (1876) provides a long list with the first ruler of Mong Mao dating from 568 A.D. The dates in Elias for later rulers of Mong Mao do not match the dates in Ming dynasty sources such as the Ming Shi-lu (Wade, 2005) and the Bai-yi Zhuan (Wade, 1996) which are considered more reliable from the time of the ruler Si Ke Fa. Kazhangjia (1990), translated into Thai by Witthayasakphan and Zhao Hong Yun (2001), also provides a fairly detailed local chronicle of Mong Mao.

List of Monarchs
Chinese name Years Length Succession Death Tai Name Other names
Si Ke Fa 1340-1371 31 years natural Hso Kip Hpa Sa Khaan Pha
Zhao Bing Fa 1371-1378 8 years son natural
Tai Bian 1378/79 1 year son murdered
Zhao Xiao Fa 1379/80 1 year brother of Zhao Bing Fa murdered
Si Wa Fa ? ? brother murdered Hso Wak Hpa
Si Lun Fa 1382-1399 17 years grandson of Si Ke Fa Hso Long Hpa
Si Xing Fa 1404-1413 9 years son abdicated
Si Ren Fa 1413-1445/6 29 years brother executed Hso Wen Hpa Sa Ngam Pha
Si Ji Fa 1445/6-1449 son executed Sa Ki Pha, Chau Si Pha
Si Bu Fa 1449-?
Si Lun Fa ?-1532 murdered Sawlon


Daniels, Christian (2006) "Historical memories of a Chinese adventurer in a Tay chronicle; Usurpation of the throne of a Tay polity in Yunnan, 1573-1584," International Journal of Asian Studies, 3, 1 (2006), pp. 21-48.

Elias, N. (1876) Introductory Sketch of the History of the Shans in Upper Burma and Western Yunnan. Calcutta: Foreign Department Press. (Recent facsimile Reprint by Thai government in Chiang Mai University library).

Jiang Yingliang (1983) Daizu Shi [History of the Dai ethnicity], Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe.

Kazhangjia, Z. (1990). "Hemeng gumeng: Meng Mao gudai zhuwang shi [A History of the Kings of Meng Mao]." In Meng Guozhanbi ji Meng Mao gudai zhuwang shi [History of Kosampi and the kings of Meng Mao]. Gong Xiao Zheng. (tr.) Kunming, Yunnan, Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe.

Liew, Foon Ming. (1996) "The Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns (1436-1449): In the Light of Official Chinese Historiography". Oriens Extremus 39/2, pp. 162-203.
Sai Kam Mong (2004) The History and Development of the Shan Scripts, Chiang Mai; Silkworm Books.

Wade, Geoff (1996) "The Bai Yi Zhuan: A Chinese Account of Tai Society in the 14th Century," 14th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand [Includes a complete translation and introduction to the Ming travelogue "Bai-yi Zhuan", a copy can be found at the Thailand Information Center at Chulalongkorn Central Library]]

Wade, Geoff. tr. (2005) Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu: an open access resource, Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of Singapore,
Witthayasakphan, Sompong and Zhao Hong Yun (translators and editors) (2001) Phongsawadan Muang Tai (Khreua Muang ku muang), Chiang Mai: Silkworm. (Translation of Mong Mao chronicle into the Thai language)


^ Elias, 1876; Daniels, 2006; Kazhangjia, 1990; Witthayasakphan and Zhao Hong Yun, 2001
^ Sai Kam Mong, 2004, p. 10, citing Jiang Yingliang, 1983
Retrieved from ""

Sunday, August 13, 2006

Christian Daniels paper on Tai chronicle history (1573-1584)

Daniels, Christian (2006) "Historical memories of a Chinese adventurer in a Tay chronicle; Usurpation of the throne of a Tay polity in Yunnan, 1573-1584," International Journal of Asian Studies, 3, 1 (2006), pp. 21-48.

This historical analysis is path breaking because it deals with Tai chronicle text on its own terms, taking it for the uniquely different historical source that it is, and showing how the Tai chronicle approach to history helps elucidate Rankean "what actually happened".

Daniels clearly shows that the Ming did use a strategy of divide and conquer in the Tai-Yunnan frontier zone. He also provides convincing evidence that a Mong Mao kingdom (state or polity) was a unifying force among the smaller geographically based chieftainships of the Tai-Yunnan frontier zone. Si Ke Fa (r. 1340-1371) clearly brought these chieftainships together for a time under the umbrella of one ruler and challenged Yuan rule along the frontier.

The paper also includes an important discussion of the "Subordination of Tay polities to the Ming" that is rigorous in both its argument and the evidence that it presents. Since events along the Tai-Yunnan frontier region played an important role in state formation in western mainland Southeast Asia to the south, namely in the formation of a Burmese state (c. 1350-1600), this section of the paper is particularly important for early modern mainland Southeast Asian history.

Tai rule along the Tai-Yunnan frontier: Unified or not unified?

What I take issue with, was how long this unification under a Mong Mao "kingdom" actually lasted. It seems like there was a unified Mong Mao kingdom (polity, state) only for the duration of Si Ke Fa's reign.

This is not to say that various geographically-based chieftainships (Daniels provides a wonderful map) did not rally together under the leadership of one primus-inter-pares Tai ruler during times of crisis when they faced a common threat. This is where the Di Cosmo-Andreski model of military mobilization and centraliation after a crisis (originating in analogous behavior along China's northern frontier) is pertinent (Fernquest, 2005).

It seems that the Mong Mao kingdom may be largely a literary creation of the Tai chronicle writers interpreting historical fact:
"The Mang Maaw Chronicle [Mong Mao Chronicle] referred to this kingdom as unifying force among the Tay, and portrayed it as a sort of ideal age when the Tay enjoyed complete independence, and remained free from intervention by outside regional powers. The chronicler invokes the disintegration and the subsequent subordination of Tay polities to China and Burma as recurring potent images." (Daniels, 2006, p. 28)

There are references to a "Mong Mao" is Burmese inscriptions and the chronicle, but there are also references to a "Syam" and many more references to individual polities, especially as times goes by. If Burmese references to Tai polities on the Yunnan frontier became more geographically specific, this would probably support a hypothesis that Ming split apart a polity or confederation of chieftainships that was previously more unified, or maybe a hypothesis that the Burmese only gradually became aware of who was attacking them. This would not be easy, if a coalition was attacking them. In such a case, local identities might have loomed larger than group identities as they seemed to have done when Si Lun Fa (Burmese: Sawlon) of Mong Yang [Burmese: Mohnyin] conquered Ava in 1524-27.

As Wade (2004, 31) shows, the fact that Ayutthaya and Lang Chang to the south eventually grew to achieve the status of states, has led some intellectuals to produce counterfactual or "virtual" history, suggesting that the chieftainships of the Tai-Yunnan border would have become large and unified states like Ayutthaya or Lang Chang, but didn't, because of Ming expansionism.

After the Tai invasion of the Burmese heartland in 1524-27, it looked like there would be a large Tai territorial state in western mainland Southeast Asia, but the resurgence of the Burmese state under Bayinnaung (r. 1551-1581) put an end to this state-forming momentum. There is always an impulse to look at these events with hindsight bias from the viewpoint of a given modern nation state or ethnic group, to moralize and lament about what could have been, but wasn't. This emic perspective, of historical as seen from inside by actual participants during and afterwards, is certainly one legitimate perspective, history was originally my written from such national or state-centric perspectives, but an emotionally uninvolved etic perspective, that tries to make sense of the events from a "World History" perspective, also seems legitimate in this day and age.

Augmenting the Daniels argument with Burmese sources

Widening the gamut of historical sources used for this period to include Burmese sources reveals some important facts. Take this observation:
"The Mang Maaw kingdom...maintained firm control over all the Tay polities, and it was only after the Ming succeeded in eliminating it in their fourth punitive military campaign of 1444 that Tay polities west of the Salween River emerged as individually prominent political entities." (Daniels, 2006, p. 28)

Evidence from the Burmese chronicle indicates that the Tai chieftainships Hsenwi and Mong Yang acted independently from any unified Mong Mao center in the warfare they engaged in with Burmese Ava to the south.

(Note: Theinni, Hsenwi, and Mu Bang all refer to the same geographically based chieftainship. Mohnyin, Mong Yang, and Meng Yang so as well.)

(Note: I'll make a list of all Burmese chronicle references to Tai polities from the fall of Pagan to the end of the Luchuan-Pingmian campaigns (1444) to demonstrate this point. )

Ava attacked Tai settlements and Tais attacked Ava's capital, far away from their home base in Yunnan, deep in the Burmese heartland. (See Fernquest, 2006)

Tai cavalry contingents also participated in Ava's military expeditions against the Mon kingdom ruled by Rajadharit in the far south. Whether this was a voluntary mercenary type of relationship or coerced troop levies, or a combination of both, is not clear, there is evidence to support both theories (Fernquest, 2006, 17).

The nature of control imposed after military action is also an issue in the warfare the Burmese king Bayinnaung (r. 1551-1581) later waged against Ayutthaya. The Burmese kingdom did not maintain territorial control for any length of time, so the Burmese kingdom could not be called an empire and this warfare really doesn’t warrant the label "expansionary" in that this term implies increased territorial control. The Burmese attacks against Ayutthaya were more like once off "raids" for manpower and plunder. I believe that Prince Damrong makes this point in "Thai Rop Bama" [Thai attacks Burma]. It is only later on in the 1570s that you see Burma trying to assert geographical control over Chiang Mai and Lan Chang. Lieberman makes this point in Burmese Administrative Cycles, I believe.


Daniels, Christian (2006) "Historical memories of a Chinese adventurer in a Tay chronicle; Usurpation of the throne of a Tay polity in Yunnan, 1573-1584," International Journal of Asian Studies, 3, 1 (2006), pp. 21-48.

Fernquest, Jon (2005) "Min-gyi-nyo, the Shan Invasions of Ava(1524-27), and the Beginnings of Expansionary Warfare in Toungoo Burma: 1486-1539," SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research 3.2 Autumn. [Addendum]

Fernquest, Jon (2006) "Rajadhirat's mask of command: Burmese military leadership, (c. 1383-1421)," SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, 4.1 Spring.

Wade, Geoff (2004) "Ming China and Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: A Reappraisal," No. 28 Working Paper Series, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, July 2004.

Friday, August 11, 2006

Myanmar Film Festival and plans for a Bayinnaung film in Burmese

After reading a bit, I still decided to write a Wikipedia article on cinema of Myanmar.

Many people have apparently been persecuted for their political beliefs in the Burmese film industry, so writing anything about it is like handling dynamite. The recent history reads like something out the McCarthy era in the United States.

Having read Burmese language books on Burma's early film industry though, I know there is a very interesting and positive history to be written here for the earlier periods at least.

A festival of Myanmar films will run from August 17 to 20 in Bangkok at the Major Ramkhamhaeng. All the films were directed by Kyi Soe Tun and have English subtitles.

Read about the film festival in the Bangkok Post (deleted in one week) and the People's Daily Online (see below).

The Burmese filmmaker Kyi Soe Tun has made historical epics on the Pagan and late Konbaung periods and plans to make a film similar to MC Chatreechalerm Yukol's "The Legend of King Naresuan" that will "tell the same story from Burengnong's [Bayinnaung's] point of view." Kyi Soe Tun is friends with MC Chatreechalerm Yukol and the script for his planned film has been finished for three years. He's currently looking for financing for the film.

Note, that I transcribed some classic Burmese film scripts, including one by Kyi Soe Tun I believe, into computer readable form and put them online several years ago. They are a good way to become familiar with the spoken Burmese language and are available online at this rather slow site.

Note also that there are no Wikipedia pages yet for Myanmar cinema. Branching off Southeast Asian cinema would be the right place to begin. Obviously, an entry has to be made for the actor Kyaw Hein. There's an article in the online Irrawaddy Magazine that provides a lot of historical background that could provide the basis for a beginning Wikipedia "stub" on Burmese or Myanmar cinema.

Myanmar film festival to be held in Bangkok

The first ever Myanmar film festival abroad will be held in Bangkok, Thailand in May, aimed at expanding the market for Myanmar films overseas, sources with the film industry circle said Friday.

Five movies will be screened in the Myanmar film festival scheduled for the second week of May, Director U Kyi Soe Tun, who is also Chairman of the Myanmar Motion Picture Organization, told Xinhua in an interview.

The films, all directed by Kyi Soe Tun himself, are titled "No Longer Slaves of Others", "Sacrificial Hearts", "The Upstream", " True Love" and "Hexagon".

Meanwhile, as part of its bid to penetrate the international film industry market, Myanmar entered Chinese film festivals with three Myanmar films during the last six years, namely, "Master of Flowers" screened in 2001, "The Hearts of the Givers" in September 2004's Yinchuan Film Festival and "Mystery of the Snow Story" in November 2005's Chinese Golden Rooster Hundred Flower Film Festival.

In 2004, Myanmar also introduced to Malaysian audience " Kyansittmin", a movie based on the life of the ancient Bagan era monarch King Kyansittha who reigned from 1084 to 1113.

To upgrade Myanmar film, Myanmar, in cooperation with Japan, jointly produced a film titled "Thway" (blood) and released in 2003.

To encourage Myanmar film production and bring up the quality, the Myanmar government presents yearly motion picture academy awards to successful artists and in December last year the government presented 11 such awards for 2004 out of 27 movies produced during the year.

Of the 11 film awards, "Mystery of the Snow Story" received the best film award. The film, which had been presented at film festivals held in Singapore, South Africa and China, was shot at a snow-capped mountain in northwestern Myanmar's Chin state. (Source: Xinhua)

Thursday, August 10, 2006

UC libraries join Google's book scanning project

From Yahoo News:

"UC joins three other major U.S. universities — Stanford, Michigan and Harvard — that are contributing their vast library collections to Google's crusade to ensure reams of knowledge written on paper makes the transition to the digital age. The New York Public Library and Oxford University also are allowing portions of their libraries to be scanned."

"The project is expected to last years and cost tens of millions of dollars — a bill that Google is footing. It's something Google can easily afford, given the nearly 8-year-old company has already amassed nearly $10 billion in cash."

On Google's library partners.

Wednesday, August 09, 2006

Chinese historical books online

Apparently it is possible to buy hard to find items in Chinese historical bibliographies online. From Frog in a Well China blog:

"So after getting consumed in the twice weekly book market near 杜甫草堂 Du Fu’s Cottage soon after arriving in Chengdu earlier this year, I was pleasantly surprised that some random, non-linear meandering online brought me to a web resource that has been absolutely invaluable for discovering just what lies within those dusty piles. 孔夫子旧书网 Kongfz ( is a bit like Biblio with which many of you might be more familiar. The site claims to be: 全球最大的中文旧书网站 Its constantly growing database renders easily searchable the holdings of literally thousands of bookshops in all corners of the PRC, large and perhaps surprisingly minuscule. Indeed, what I found when I went looking for one of these ’shops’ in Chengdu was the owner and his brother having a quiet lunch in their sparsely furnished flat, while each room in the flat across the landing was overflowing with the books they had for sale. The booksellers themselves maintain their own online databases and many seem to add new books daily, as well as sell books daily, so there’s a bit of urgency sometimes to reserve what interests you the moment you see it as the next day it may already have been sold.

Most of the books on offer are out of print, published over the last two decades or so, (as print runs were generally quite small), but what’s available goes well beyond such more purely secondary sources. Many published collections of archival materials as well as 地方誌 both old and new and other collections of original materials are available for sometimes widely varying prices, as well as reprints of Qing or Republican era books. Among the items I’ve purchased was a 油印本 version of a book which original a certain library in Chengdu was only grudgingly willing to let me see, but certainly not photocopy or even photograph."

Bloodshed in warfare, Statistics

Selected Death Tolls for Wars, Massacres and Atrocities Before the 20th Century

Casualty statistics for warfare and other forms of collective violence that may be useful for comparing intensity and casualty rates over geography and time.

Obtained from a syllabus for a anthropology of war class.

Tuesday, August 08, 2006

Area Studies: The challenges

Area studies as an intellectual focus of scholarship, especially for those areas of the world enmeshed in longstanding conflicts, like the Middle East that the well-known blogger-scholar Juan Cole specializes in or Burma studies presents many challenges.

First of all, one must really approach area studies through one of the established disciplines such as history, political science, sociology, anthropology, or religious studies. Area studies departments themselves are usually virtual departments with no real faculty of their own. The area studies field exerts an influence on what is researched and published, comparisons between mainland and insular Southeast Asia being more common than comparisons with Yunnan or India, for instance, even though the later comparisons may be more germane. Ultimately, the topics and methodologies of research and the forum for publicaiton and peer review will discipline specific. History used to be the most important discipline in area studies but history's influence has been diluted by the post-WWII rise of the social sciences.

If you are European or Japanese or Australian or American scholar and you are writing the history of Southeast Asia, you face many challenges (or constraints if you want to phrase the challenge negatively, which I'd rather not do).

Someone writing the history of a given area of the world, who is not a member of this modern nation state, or ethnic group, must:

1. Maintain objectivity.

Increasingly difficult to do as subjects become politically polarized and academia questions the very idea of objective truth in postmodernism. Nonetheless, journalism and Wikipedia provide models.

2. Represent the interests of the area they are studying in a fair manner to the modern nation state they are a member of (without letting this advocacy reduce their historical scholarship to mere presentism).

3. Remain a loyal, yet critical, citizen of their nation state.

Imperative #2 can sometimes lead one to forget that everyone, including oneself is a citizen of some nation state, and that being a citizen of this state requires loyalty and even laying down one's life to defend it in times of war. These loyalties could obviously pose quite a dilemna sometimes.

I was struck by Juan Cole's Library of Americana Translation Project today. This is the right way to go. An area studies specialist will be familiar with the ways that America's history might be relevant to the area they specialize in, and will also know how to make its presentation politically sensitive.

I have taught in universities overseas for a long time, and while I was teaching and supervising, have been criticized by British and Australians for textbooks, that I didn't even choose, that had extensive references to American culture in them, usually pop culture though, so I have taken extraordinary pains to make my teaching material culturally neutral, but I have also realized that being too zealous in this regard can be viewed by some Americans as being anti-American which is hardly my belief or stance at all. I love my country and I am quite proud of its economic and political institutions, but having lived abroad for a long time, I feel that they are not always suitable in other cultures that differ from the west in important underlying ways.

Translation in the other direction from the area studied to English is not valued nearly enough by academia which valorizes secondary interpretations more. This is really a shame because translations would allow people in the west to familiarize themselves with cultures that are quite alien from theirs for themselves and make their own judgements about them.

3. Making their research relevant to the present.

Direct analogies between current events and the past are often deceiving, deceiving enough to have been labelled the presentist fallacy.

By addressing higher level intellectual categories that are relevant to both the present and the past, such as the notions of "state formation," "state collapse," "just war," or "endemic warfare" to name just a few, a more careful and exact analogies between the present and the past can be made.

Ming-Tai Relations (1369-1398)

Ming-Tai Relations (1369-1398)

In Ming sources, one man dominates the early history of Ming-Tai frontier relations, the Tai leader Si Lun Fa. We will be looking closely at two of these sources, the Ming Shi-lu and the Bai-yi Zhuan. Most historical interpretations of the period accept the predominance of this Tai leader and what Ming sources have to say about him rather uncritically.

We will compare two possible reconstructions of his life and role in Tai resistance to the Ming conquest of Yunnan. The first reconstruction follows the Ming Shi-lu closely and casts him as a strong ruler of a unified state that often acted in a deceitful manner in the eyes of the Ming court. (role of punitive Ming exploitation?), The second reconstruction takes its cue from some of the observations of theMing envoys to the Tai frontier region who wrote the Bai-yi Zhuan travelogue/ethnography. It casts Si Lun-fa as a weak ruler of a fragmented state who was basically nominated by the Ming to rule as their minion or puppet in the Tai frontier region. Both reconstructions are admittedly extremes, the truth probably lying somewhere in between.

Does the fact that Upper Burma suffered from Tai raids during this time support the contention that the Tais of the frontier region worked together in a unified state? Evidence over the period 1350-1600 indicates that Tai states acted independently often drawing into temporary cooperative confederations and alliances for strength and solidarity (cite my paper). These confederations were fragile and usually only held together for short periods of time. Furthermore, the emergent Mon and southern Ayutthaya states also exhibit this decentralized nature.

The initial Ming attempts to win Yunnan over (1369-1380)

The first communications between the Ming dynasty and Yunnan were prescient of Yunnan’s future. Ritualistic language in formal letters of "instruction" signaled the beginning of Ming rule along the Tai-Yunnan-Burma frontier. Submission to the Ming was the next inevitable step in the cosmological order:

"From ancient times, those who have been lords of all under Heaven have looked on that which is covered by Heaven, that which is contained by the Earth and that on which the sun and moon shine, and regardless of whether the place was near or far, or what manner of people they are, there was no place for which they did not wish a peaceful land and a prosperous existence. It is natural that when China is governed peacefully, foreign countries would come and submit (來附)”…I am anxious that, as you are secluded in your distant places, you have not yet heard of my will. Thus, I am sending envoys to go and instruct you, so that you will all know of this" (14 Jul 1370, my italics).

The Mongol prince Balaswarmi, a remnant of the Yuan dynasty, ruled over Yunnan from the capital in Kunming. He ruled indirectly over an ethnically diverse collection of small polities and chieftainships in Yunnan. The most powerful of these states was controlled by the Tuan family who ruled over the area surrounding Dali (Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, p.143-44).

The Ming Shi-lu reports that envoys were sent to instruct the inhabitants of Yunnan in 1371 (MSL 8 Oct 1371). In 1372 the famous scholar Wang Wei offered terms of surrender to Yunnan as an envoy. The envoy Wang Wei was murdered in 1374 and another mission was sent in 1375. Once again the mission failed. A diplomatic mission was sent to Burma in 1374, but because Annam was at war with Champa the roads were blocked and the mission was recalled (MSL 1 Jan 1374). By 1380 the Ming were no longer wording their communications as if Yunnan was a separate country (Wade, 2004, 4). Initial gentle promptings were soon to be followed by military force.

The Ming invasion and conquest of Yunnan (1380-1383)

In 1380 the Ming emperor changed his policy towards Yunnan. In the founding of the previous Yuan dynasty, Yunnan’s location had been of strategic importance and now figured into Ming geopolitical strategy. The Yuan had conquered the Dali region in Yunnan in order to surround the Southern Song, the last remnants of the Song dynasty. Remnants of the Mongol Yuan dynasty now remained as a threat for the Ming:

"...the Mongols were still occupying the Mongolian Grassland, and could launch southern expeditions at any time they wished. More importantly, the Mongols still occupied Yunnan. If the Mongols attacked Ming China both from the north and from the southwest, the Ming court would have battles on two fronts. Therefore, in the 1370s, the Ming dynasty was facing a situation that was similar to what the Southern Song failed to cope with when Kublai Khan took over the Dali Kingdom. Such an international pattern pushed the Ming ruler to launch a campaign against Yunnan in order to avoid the fate of the Southern Song" (Bin Yang, 2004, Military Campaigns against Yunnan: A Global Analysis, National University of Singapore working paper, 51-52, 54).

Citing a precedent in the Han dynasty for tighter control, a military expedition was organized to conquer Yunnan:

"The Emperor thus ordered the various generals to select and deploy troops and gave them, in advance, cloth and paper money for their clothing needs. A total of 249,100 people were involved and they were provided with 344,390 bolts of cloth and over 408,980 ding of paper money" (MSL 20 Aug 1380).

In September 1381 Fu You-de was appointed commander of Yunnan expeditionary forces with Lan Yu and Mu Ying, well-hardened veterans of early Ming campaigns in the Mongol north, as his assistants. The expeditionary forces amounted to 300,000 troops and were split into a larger force and a smaller diversionary force. Yunnan was quickly taken:

"Fu Yu-te’s army reached Hu-kuang in October. In December he sent the smaller force to Yung-ning and Wu-sa, while he led the larger forces as planned into Yunnan. Balaswarmi sent 100,000 troops to guard Chu-ching, but Fu Yu-te and Mu Ying captured the enemy general and 20,000 of his troops. Fu Yu-te then quickly led a smaller force to aid the army at Wu-sa, while Lan Yu and Mu Ying hastened toward K’un-ming. On 6 January 1382, Balaswarmi, who had fled his city, burned his princely robes, drove his wife to her death in a lake and then committed suicide together with his chief ministers" (Cambridge Ming History, 144-46; Liew Foon Ming, 1986, 162-63; MSL 18 Sep 1381).

By February 1382 the Ming had extended its control over the area surrounding the capital of Yunnan at modern day Kunming and a further expedition was sent to Dali:

"...the Duan family had been semi-autonomous in the Dali area under the Yuan dynasty and thought this was a good opportunity to resume its former independent status. When Fu Youde wrote to ask the Duans to surrender, Duan Shi, the chief of the Duans, cited historical experience to legitimatize his claim of autonomy. He argued that the Dali area was a foreign kingdom during the Tang dynasty, and had been outside of the boundary demarcated by the jade axe during the Song period; furthermore, this region and its population were too small to be a prefecture of China, so there was no benefit for the Ming force to come, neither was there any loss if the Ming state gave up its military campaign. Duan Shi suggested that the Ming court follow the Tang and Song mode of management to rebuild a type of tribute relationship."

"Fu ignored this response and repeated his request. Duan was annoyed, and threatened the Ming generals in the second letter. He emphasized that the geographic and biological advantages for the military defense of Dali were so great that the Ming would likely repeat the disaster of previous Chinese expeditions. Fu was irritated and detained the Duan envoys. Duan Shi then wrote a third letter with a more 'arrogant' tone. Fu realized that a peaceful negotiation did not work, so he launched an attack. The Duan power was eventually destroyed" (Bin Yang, 2004, 52-3, citing as source: Fang, Guoyu (1998) Yunnan Shiliao Congkan (Series of Historical Documents on Yunnan), Kunming: Yunnandaxue Chubanshe, 13 Vols).

The family that had ruled over the Dali region was sent into exile at the Ming capital in Nanjing.

The powerful Tai ruler Si Lun-fa submits (1382)

A powerful Tai chieftain named Si Lun-fa ruled over an area along the Tai-Yunnan frontier which the Chinese called Pingmian:

"From Da-li in Yun-nan, one passes through Jin-chi and then arrives there…During the Yuan dynasty, it was regularly subordinate to Ava-Burma. They have walled towns with outlying suburbs, both containing buildings and houses. The people all live in multi-storied houses. Their products are elephants and horses. Both officials and the people shave their heads like monks. When coming or going, they ride on elephants. In the earlier dynasties, they did not have contact with China. It was only in the Yuan dynasty that an envoy was sent to pacify and instruct them and they came to offer tribute" (MSL 21 Aug 1384).

The political situation along the Tai-Yunnan frontier was chaotic and fragmented. Leadership passed hands frequently and often violently among members of the Tai ruling clans. In 1348-49 the Yuan general Da-shi-ba-du-lu was sent to subdue the Tai ruler Si Ke-fa who was aggressively raiding the domains of neighboring Tai chieftains. The Yuan general was not successful and Si Ke-fa continued his raids, sending his son Man-sa to the Yuan court to pay allegiance, but the court reported that "while he accepted the court’s calendar and offered tribute, his clothing, paraphernalia and systems remained like those of a king" (Wade, 1996, Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 1).

After Si Ke-fa’s death several members of the ruling clan held power for relatively short periods of time. First, leadership passed to Si Ke-fa’s son Zhao Bing-fa. After a relatively long eight year reign, Si Ke-fa’s other son Tai-bian assumed power. Tai-bian was murdered by his paternal uncle after only a year. The uncle, Zhao Xiao-fa, became ruler, but was in turn murdered by bandits just one year later. Si Wa-fa, the younger brother of Zhao Xiao-fa, assumed power. In the year following the pacification of Yunnan in 1382:

"Si Wa-fa attacked Jin-chi [modern-day Bao Shan]. During that winter Si Wa-fa hunted in Zhelan and Nan-dian. His subordinate Da-lu-fang and others abruptly established Si Lun-fa, the son of Man-sa, as ruler, and killed Si Wa-fa while he was away" (Wade’s Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 1, 11; compare MSL 11 Mar 1396 which has Si Lun-fa attack Jin-chi, Jing-dong, and Ding-bian).

Jin-chi had been established as a garrison to control the Tai-Yunnan frontier during the early Yuan dynasty (Wade, 1996, Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 1). Now it played a pivotal role as a staging point for expeditions into the frontier region. In 1382 when Si Lun-fa heard that Dali had been taken, he marched to Jinchi and quickly submitted to the Ming (Liew Foon Ming, 1996, 163). In April 1382 Pingmian was made into an indigenous autonomous region and Si Lun-fa was appointed governor there. In August 1384 Si Lun-fa sent a tribute mission to the Ming court in Nanjing under the leadership of Dao Ling-meng. The seal of authority issued to Pingmian by the previous Yuan court was surrendered and Pingmian was promoted to a higher level of indigenous autonomous region. In September the adjacent Tai state of Luchuan was merged with Pingmian and given to Si Lun-fa. During the Yuan dynasty, Luchuan and Pingmian had been ruled separately (MSL 14 Sep 1384, MSL 21 Aug 1384).

Coinciding with the Ming conquest of Yunnan of 1382, Tai raids on Burmese Ava to the south resumed in the early 1380’s. In 1383 Ava petitioned the Ming to intervene for them to halt the raids. The Ming court intervened on their behalf (Harvey, p. 85). Parker notes that ”the Ming history tells us that ‘in 1384 the appointment of Comforter of Mien chung was made, and as complaints had been made by the chieftain Pu-la-lang of attacks by Sz-lun-fah, a mission was sent to expostulate, and both sides suspended arms’” (Parker, p. 49). The Ming conquest of Yunnan in 1382 brought about other changes: “In 1382 Meng Yang was changed into a prefecture (fu) and two years later into a civilian and military suan-wei-shi paying commuted corvee dues at the rate of taels…750 per year” (Scott, Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, Mohnyin, p. 346)

Razadarit ascended the throne of the southern Mon kingdom of Pegu in 1385. The ruler of Myaungmya tried to gain Ava’s support to overthrow Razadarit and this started a large-scale war that raged on and off between Upper and Lower Burma for several decades until 1425 (U Kala I: 438-439; Harvey, p. 82). Shan troop levies made by Ava from Shan states such as Mong Yang, Kale, and Yawnghwe formed a large part of Ava’s forces in these wars. Were these troop levies or war captives? These troop levies at least attest to the fact that some power was held by Ava over Tai states on the Tai-Yunnan frontier by this time.

In 1383 the initial conquest of Yunnan was brought to an end and the military commanders Fu You-de and Lan Yu were called back to the capital. Mu Ying was left as the hereditary military governor of Yunnan (Cambridge, 146) and Gao Zheng was stationed with troops at Chu-xiong (MSL 5 Feb 1384). Altogether 160 people were escorted back to the capital including two former officials of the Yuan court in Yunnan, Guan-yin-bao and Liu Che-che-bu-hua together with chieftains from Yunnan including one named Duan Shi. Those escorted back presented 170 horses to the Ming emperor and received paper money and clothing in return. Guan-yin-bao was appointed as commandant of Jin-chi and was given the name Li Guan (MSL 30 Mar 1383).

Steps were also taken to ensure a food supply for the large Chinese garrisons that remained in Yunnan after the campaigns. An envoy was sent from the Ming capital to Annam, in modern-day northern Vietnam, with a request for grain. Grain (5,000 shi) was sent to Shui-wei on the Lin-an border of Yunnan. The Annam ruler Pan, in a display of magnanimity, refused to accept the gifts of gold and silks sent by the Chinese court (MSL 5 Aug 1384). The provincial government of Yunnan used their salt monopoly to ensure that the supply of rice in Yunnan was adequate:

"Under the old precedents, merchants brought rice to Jin-chi [Baoshan] and for every dou, they were given one yin of salt. This was allowed to ensure grain supplies. Thus the merchants collected there and the supplies were more than sufficient. Later, officials did not allow the transport of grain and the merchants rarely went there. Thus, the troops now have no means of ration supply. It is requested that the old system be followed" (MSL 4 Feb 1386, my italics).

The "old precedent" of using salt for military rice procurement must have been effective in the early 1380’s when Ming forces had just newly arrived in Yunnan. The food supply in Yunnan was not sufficient to support the population increase that followed the establishment of Ming garrisons. Yunnan was endowed with a more than adequate salt supply though.

The Chinese court took measures to curb corruption. Chinese administrators who were appointed from outside Yunnan were provided with adequate means of support, so they didn’t have to resort to bribery which could have been a cause of resentment and rebellion among the local inhabitants:

"Those who have inherited posts have long lived in their territories and they have their own stores and means of livelihood. It is thus not necessary to provide them with salaries and allowances. Those who are appointed have generally come to sojourn (流寓) in these areas and because they have won the support of the local people we are employing them for a time. If we do not give them salaries, they will have no means of sustaining a livelihood. The law officials are more likely to accept bribes (MSL 2 Dec 1384).

By 1384 the Ming had established a modicum of control over Yunnan, a control that would soon be challenged by the Tai chieftain Si Lun-fa.

The gradual Ming conquest of the Tai-Yunnan frontier

After the Ming conquest of Yunnan, Tai leaders launched a series of counter-attacks against the Ming at Jin-chi, Jong-dong, and then Ding-bian (MSL 11 Mar 1396). An explicit chronology helps to untangle the complicated series of events that followed the conquest:

1382 - Conquest of Yunnan. Kunming taken.
1382 - Dali taken.
1382 - Tai chieftain Si Lun-fa submits at Jin-chi.
1383 - Jin-chi [Baoshan] attacked by Si Wa-fa.
1384 - Si Lun-fa’s tribute mission to the Ming court. Si Lun-fa is given extensive authority by the Ming over the Tai-Yunnan frontier.
1386/87 - Jing-dong attacked by Dao Si-lang
1386/87 - Ming counterattack defeated by Tai forces
1388 – Tai forces attack Moshale stockade
1388 – Ming counterattack. Tai leader Dao Si-lang defeated
1388 – Tai raids on Ding-bian
1388 – Ming defeat Tais in a decisive battle. Tai side flees towards Dingbian and Jingdong.
1388 – Si Lun-fa is captured and is forced to pay indemnity and join Ming forces in internal police actions against other defiant rulers in Yunnan.

The Ming Shi-lu and official Chinese history attributes these post-conquest conflicts to the actions of the most prominent Tai leader Si Lun-fa. There are clear indications in other sources though that subordinate Tai leaders often acted independently. This interpretation of independent action by secondary Tai states is consistent with the endemic warfare found in the Tai-Yunnan frontier during this period.

In January 1386 Tai forces attacked Ming controlled Jingdong and the newly appointed Jingdong governor E-tao fled to a place named Baiyai Chuan in Dali. After the Tais attacked Jingdong, the governor of Yunnan, Mu Ying, sent the official Feng Cheng to attack the Tai forces, but he was defeated, fog and bad weather playing a role in the defeat (MSL 2 Jan 1391; Liew Foon Ming, 1996, 165). Many of the Tai elite were still not under Si Lun-fa's control: "Zi-qing and other persons in Meng-hua Subprefecture still obstructed culture and would not submit. He thus proposed that these guards be established" (MSL 2 Jan 1391).

Following the humiliating defeat at Jingdong, the Chinese censor Li Yuanming was sent from the capital to Pingmian on the frontier to investigate the situation. Li Yuanming’s report displeased the emperor and in May 1387 claiming that he had been deceived by Si Lun-fa and the Tais and ordered military defences to be prepared and all communications to cease:

"Recently, the Censor Li Yuan-ming returned from Ping-mian. I have listened to his words and know of the deception and deceitfulness of the Bai-yi. Even in tens of thousands of their words, not one can be believed. I have observed that the man and the yi have rebelled and are watching, ready to make use of opportunities. They present a danger to our borders.”

“It is appropriate to build defences in the Jin-chi, Chu-xiong, Pin Dian, Lan-cang and Jiang-zhong circuits. They must have high walls and deep moats, firm palisades and many cannons for defence. When the yi come, they must not be fought with lightly, and deployment must be made as the situations dictate.”

“Last year, the central Yun-nan military commander sent people to the Bai-yi and these people demanded much property and goods. They did not consider the seriousness of the situation and, displaying their power, acted in a martial manner and ridiculed the various man. Also, because the Jing-jiang Prince was without abilities, the Da-li seal was used to issue orders. All of these acts were wrong and even insulting to the Emperor and embarrassing to the Court” (MSL 28 May 1387).

This imperial proclamation makes two assumptions which may not have have held in practice. First, that there was centralized and coordinated control and action among the leaders of the Tai frontier states. Second, it assumes that Ming intentions and expectations about the behavior of Tai states and leaders had been completely communicated from the Ming center to Tai leaders on the periphery. The emperor decides on diplomatic isolation as a solution:

“From now on, no-one is permitted to go to Ping-mian. It should be treated with coolness. If it sends a despatch, a brief response is to be made, but if it does not send any despatches, no actions are to be initiated. If they send tribute products, they are not to be received. Then in a few years, the territory of Lu-chuan will be included on the maps as part of the Empire. Ministers, you must firmly observe my words and must not be remiss in this!" (MSL 28 May 1387).

In the wake of this diplomatic isolation in February 1388, Tai forces attacked and took Mo-sha-le stockade in Malang-talang dian chieftainship, a position of strategic importance along the frontier (in modern-day Xinping, Eshan Yizu or Xinhua). Mu Ying sent Ning Zheng to uproot the Tais. Under the leadership of Dao Si-lang, the Tais gathered over 100,000 soldiers and 100 elephants, but were overwhelmed by the Chinese who killed over 1,500, including two generals, and seized Tai elephants and horses. The remaining troops fled (MSL 3 Jun 1396, MSL 13 Feb 1388, Cambridge; Liew Foon Ming, 1996, 165). After the defeat at Mo-sha-le stockade repeated raids were made on Ding-bian in Chu-xiong prefecture:

"The Xi-ping Marquis Mu Ying punished Si Lun-fa of the Bai-yi and pacified him. At this time, Si Lun-fa had raised a force of 300,000 men and over 100 elephants and had repeatedly attacked Ding-bian. He wanted to gain revenge for the Mo-sha-le campaign and his force was extremely violent. The newly-attached man and yi secretly formed alliances and they all had rebellious inclinations” (MSL 6 May 1388)."

There is evidence that the Tai leader Diao Si-lang acted independently from Si Lun-fa in waging this attack against Dingbian. Two passages from the Bai-yi Zhuan, a late-fourteenth century travel diary of a Ming diplomatic mission travelling through the Tai-Yunnan frontier, support this interpretation:

"In the bing-yin year [1386/87], they again [Tai forces] attacked Jing-dong. The following year, a subordinate named Diao Si-lang attacked Ding-bian. The Son of Heaven ordered the Xi-ping Marquis Mu Ying to take on command of the troops and destroy him. Diao Si-lang was captured and the Yi people submitted through fear…” (Wade, Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 2)."

"…Dao Si-lang did not obey your commands [the emperor] and plundered Ding-bian. While you were unable to bring an end to those hostilities, Heaven provided majesty to our border commanders and thereby Dao Silang and the others were immediately exterminated” (Wade, Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 11)"

Which Tai leaders were individually or collectively responsible for Tai military actions in the period following the Ming conquest (1382-1388) is not entirely clear, but by 1388 different Tai chieftains who may have been acting independently in the past are joining together into a centralized and more coordinated confederation. Along the lines of the Di Cosmo-Andreski model of state formation (see Fernquest, 2005b, 373-377) in the face of a rising crisis, the Tai-frontier is moving from a segmentary decentralized state to a more unified state.

A large Ming punitive expedition to the Tai-Yunnan frontier (1388)

In the period after the Ming conquest of Yunnan (1382-1388), Tai attacks on Ming frontier outposts eventually led to a large-scale Ming punitive expedition. The governor of Yunnan, Mu Ying, was ordered to punish the Tai leader Si Lun-fa and a military training mission was sent to Yunnan. To ensure an adequate food supply for the large expedition, an official was sent to Sichuan with 32,000 ding of paper money to purchase 10,000 head of ploughing buffalo. State farms and grain stores were to be set up in Yunnan to provide a food supply for the increased troops in Yunnan (MSL 1 Oct 1387). Local rulers loyal to the Ming asked for troop reinforcements (MSL 6 Jul 1387). With a cavalry of 30,000 Mu Ying marched towards Dingbian on the Tai frontier. Arriving near the Tai encampment after 15 days, he built defensive fortifications for battle. The Ming Shi-lu relates:

“First 300 light cavalrymen were sent to provoke them [the Tais]. The Bai-yi [Tais] met them with 10,000 men and 30 vanguard elephants to do battle. Zhang Yin, commander of the Yun-nan Forward Guard, led 50-plus cavalrymen as a vanguard, while the chieftains, astride their huge elephants, proceeded forward. Our army let fly with their arrows and these hit an elephant in the left knee and the ribs. The elephant fell to the ground and the chieftain was also hit, but fled. He was pursued and killed with arrows. Then, with great screams, the troops rushed forward and hundreds of heads were taken. The army took advantage of the victory and proceeded forward with a great uproar. The bandit forces thus drew back” (MSL 6 May 1388).

The next morning Mu Ying brought his generals and aides together and addressed them to spur them into battle and brought a special repeating crossbow weapon into the battle:

“[Mu Ying] issued orders to the army to set up guns and 'mystical-mechanism arrows' (神機箭) in three lines within the ranks. Then when the elephants advanced, the front line of guns was to fire its arrows. If the elephants did not retreat, the second line was to fire off its arrows. If the elephants still did not fall back, the third line was to fire its arrows” (MSL 6 May 1388)

The Ming Shi-lu describes the Tai battle array:

“[The Tais] came out of their camp and joined ranks to meet them. The chieftains, local commanders and the zhao-gang all rode on elephants. The elephants were all armoured and on their backs they bore a battle-turret like a parapet, while bamboo tubes hung on the two sides. Short lances were placed between these prepared for attacks. When the forces were about to meet, the massed elephants rushed forward. Our army attacked them and fired off arrows and stones. The sound shook the mountains and valleys and the elephants, shaking with fear, fled” (MSL 6 May 1388)

The Ming forces pursued the Tai forces right up to their stockade and lit the stockade on fire. The Ming Shi-lu describes how discipline increased the intensity of battle:

“From a high vantage point Mu Ying saw that the left force of our army had retreated a little. He thus sent urgent orders that the force commander be beheaded. The force commander was thus frightened and roused and, with a yell, rushed into the fray. The troops followed him and each was worth 100 men” (MSL 6 May 1388).

There were heavy casualties among the defeated Tai forces:

“the bandits' most valiant and powerful fighter was called Xi-la-zhe and he led their troops in fighting to the death…Over 30,000 heads were taken and over 10,000 men were taken prisoner. More than half of the elephants were killed and 37 were taken alive. The remaining bandits all fled. Our army pursued and attacked them, the bandits were unable to eat for days on end, and their corpses were found lying side by side. Si Lun-fa fled” (MSL 6 May 1388).

Mu Ying sent word of the victory to the capital and led his troops back.

The Pursuit

The defeated Tai forces retreated to Jing-dong and Ding-bian and Mu Ying received instructions from the Ming capital to move against them:

"Your report has recently been received and it is known that you have destroyed the Bai-yi [Tais] and that Si Lun-fa has fled. You are now to move the troops and exert gradual pressure on Jing-dong. However, the yi are by nature obstinate and barbaric. If they do not accept guilt and offer to surrender, they will indeed engage in more intrusive attacks” (MSL 25 May 1388).

Particular attention was again paid to ensuring an adequate food supply to support the soldiers on the expedition:

“Ding-bian is distant from the Yun-nan lake by at least 10 days by slow march. If the troops proceed there at a fast march, they will find it difficult to do battle. You should ensure security, state farms should be opened up, and firm walls should be erected so that battle can be done with them. When the Great Army is collected and ready, the advance should begin” (MSL 25 May 1388).

Mu Ying was also instructed to give the Tai leaders the option of paying an indemnity if they wished to surrender:

“If they want to offer tribute and request that the troops be withdrawn, you should instruct them in the Great Precepts of Right Conduct, require them to repay the funds (Alt: food) we have expended and have them present to the Court 15,000 horses and the troops who were killed in Jing-dong. They are also to be instructed to offer as tribute 500 elephants, 30,000 buffalo and 300 elephant attendants. If they listen to orders and offer tribute in the amounts specified, their request to surrender should be allowed” (MSL 25 May 1388).

The Tai leader Si Lun-fa sent a mission to Kunming to submit to the Ming, but blamed two other Tai leaders for the military actions against the Ming:

“Then he [Si Lun-fa] sent his local commanders and pacifiers to Yun-nan [Kun-ming] to advise that plans for rebellion in the past had not been his, and rather had been hatched by his subordinates Dao Si-lang and Dao Si-yang. He requested that his crimes be forgiven and advised willingness to offer tribute.”

Mu Ying sent word of the Tai submission to the capital and an official named Da-yong was sent to deal with the matter. The envoy carried with him a message for Si Lun-fa from the emperor. Si Lun-fa’s domain, Luchuan was seen as a distant and strange place:

"…Lu-chuan is secluded in the South-west, 10,000 li in the distance. It is not in China's maps. Why is Lu-chuan alone like this? Like in Yun-nan's territory, the roads are precipitous, the people make their lairs on cliffs and have to drink their water from the springs and rivers below. They have animal form and yi appearance and their ways are lacking in moral principles.”

The emperor relates the history of the Ming conquest of Yunnan and compares the intransigence of the Tai leader with the “Liang Prince”, the former Mongol-Yuan ruler of Yunnan, Balaswarmi.

“Only you, Si Lun-fa, have imitated and surpassed the Liang Prince. You have taken in our fugitives and have done so for several years. The Jin-chi and Jing-dong campaigns resulted from your actions. I said that you sought more people and wanted to expand your territory, that you wanted to challenge China and it was thus that you dared to create trouble. Therefore I ordered the skilled generals to lead their troops to establish camps and fields where they could both plant crops and protect our territory” (MSL 28 Nov 1389).

The emperor admits that he is not certain that Si Lun-fa was completely in control of the Tai forces that attacked the Ming:

“Now, you have come and claimed that the previous violations on the border were not your doing but rather the acts of Dao Si-lang and so on. I have not examined whether this is so or not” (MSL 28 Nov 1389).

He could be wrong in attributing all the Tai attacks to Si Lun-fa, but he demands that Si Lun-fa pay an indemnity to “assuage the anger of the various generals.” The emperor also demands that Si Lun-fa join with Chinese forces in an expedition against a rebellious Yunnan leader named Zhi-chun.

An alternative interpretation to the traditional interpretation of these events that closely follows the Ming Shi-lu is possible, namely that Si Lun-fa was basically the Chinese emperor’s agent among a Tai leadership that lacked unity and coordination. Ming officials misunderstood the nature of political control in the Tai-Yunnan frontier region, attributing to Si Lun-fa the leadership of a centralized, unified state, and in the end through their support, Si Lun-fa effectively became their agent in the frontier region.

Around 1390 there was an incident that casts in bold relief the different Tai versus Chinese views of gift giving. In 1389-90 the Chinese court appointed an official to deliver credentials and orders of instruction to Luchuan-Lingmian. When he arrived, they presented him with gifts including gold which he refused. According to the Ming Annals, he was told by the Tai "if you do not accept this display of kindness, the man [babrabarian] people may well harbour suspicion and engage in rebellion. It is better to accept the presents," but he quickly handed them over to the Yunnan provincial administration. Following his successful mission, when he returned to the capital he was promoted to his new post (MSL 16 Oct 1390). In 1390 Si-Lun-fa again sent a tribute mission to the capital (MSL 26 Oct 1390). Two garrisons were established in Jing-dong and Meng-hua around 1391 (MSL 2 Jan 1391).

Failed Ming attempts at intervention on the Tai-Yunnan frontier (1390’s)

To recap, after the Ming conquest of Yunnan, intermittent fighting continued along the Tai-Yunnan frontier from 1382 until the major Ming expedition of 1388. In the wake of this large expedition, Tai raids changed direction to the south attacking Ava. These attacks escalated once again in the early 1390’s as they had done during the period of crisis at Ava from 1359 to 1368.

In 1393 Mong Yang attacked Ava territory and the ruler of Legaing [Minbu] led troops against them, but was driven back to Sagaing. Tai forces laid siege to Sagaing, burning buildings, and surrounding the town walls, but Thilawa, ruler of Yamethin to the south of Ava, led troops to Sagaing ending the siege. Thilawa drove the Tai attackers off as far as Shangon, 20 miles to the northwest of Sagaing, were he defeated them in battle (U Kala I: 458-461; Harvey, p.85)

In 1395 Ava sent a mission to the Ming court seeking their support and asking Ming envoys to mediate. In response the Ming established the “Mianzhong” pacification commission at Ava (Sun Lai Chen dissertation, p. 79, 234, citing Chen Yi-sein, “Ming-chu de Zhong Mian guanxi” 2 (1969):14-19, 27, 29; a later Ming geographical treatise provides support for this claiming that in 1393 a tribute mission from Ava was sent to the Ming capital led by “the Burmese chieftain Nansu” and in 1393 the Burmese chieftain “Pulalang” [Minkyiswasawke] was appointed the “Pacification Commissioner” (Liew Foon Ming, 2003, pp. 162, 158, citing Gu Zuyi (1631-1692; reprint 1993) “Du shi fangyu jiyao gaoben,” Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe).

A Ming mission to Burma: An attempt to end the Tai incursions (1396)

Continuing the long succession of missions that had been sent from the Ming capital to the Tai-Yunnan frontier, Li Si-cong and Qian Gu-xun were sent in 1396 on a much longer mission to Burmese Ava and the Tai-Yunnan frontier. At the end of their mission in 1497, Li Si-cong and Qian Gu-xun wrote the now famous account of life in the Tai frontier region, the Baiyi Zhuan, essentially an ethnography or travelogue of their journey. The mission was sent to put an end to warfare in the frontier zone (MSL 11 Mar 1396). Ava had been “engaged in armed conflict” with the Tai for several years and in the winter of 1395-96 Ava made a formal complaint to the Ming court (Wade, 1996, Bai-yi Zhuan, p. 8). There were raids against other locations besides Ava as well, as evidenced in the Ming emperor’s admonitions:

“You should be punished for the crime of taking advantage of weakness to attack an isolated state. Why is this so said? Every year you have used troops in attacking Che-li [Sipsongpanna] and in frequently invading and plundering Ba-bai [Lan Na]. You have also relied on your strength to attack Burma [Ava] and Jia-li [Kale]. They are small states and their people few and now you have taken them” (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

The Bai-yi Zhuan portrays Tai leadership as less unified than the Ming Shi-lu does. Unlike official histories such as the Ming Shi or Ming Shi-lu, the Bai-yi Zhuan was composed on the scene, right on the Tai-Yunnan frontier by the envoys themselves who must have actually talked to the very historical actors who had participated in the Tai-Ming warfare of the 1380’s. The emperor wrote long messages of instruction to both the rulers of Burma and Si Lun-fa for the envoys to take with them on their journey. The imperial message to the Burmese king of Ava describes the distance and separation between the Chinese capital and Burmese Ava quite poetically:

"The roads are long and dangerous, the mountains and rivers present great obstacles and your customs and practices are different. These situations were created by Heaven and fixed by Earth. You have been diligent in sending an envoy on the long and dangerous journey, to cross neighbouring states, to rush through mist and push through fog, to push onward at dawn and not rest till dusk, and to suffer the wind and the cold until he reached China. It is indeed a difficult journey. The ancients had a saying: `When a superior man wishes to undertake some matter at a distant place, even though it be more than a thousand li away, spirit will communicate and intent will be understood.' Now, from 10,000 li distant, you have diligently sent an envoy over such a distance. This demonstration of worthiness would have been extraordinary in the past, and is quite singular today” (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

The Ming emperor envisaged a state of peace between the Burmese and Tais:

“…bring an end to the problems, allowing both sides to be done with warfare, so as to preserve your people's happiness both in the towns and throughout the countryside. The people of your two countries, although living in their separate places, could live in peace with nothing more required than the maintenance of careful inspections at the border passes and markets” (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

The message of instruction that the Ming emperor presented to Si Lun-fa outlined nine kinds of punitive military expedition in Chinese political traditions and finds Si Lun-fa guilty of violating one of them:

“You, Si Lun-fa, are subject to these nine punitive expeditions. You should be punished for the crime of taking advantage of weakness to attack an isolated state. Why is this so said? Every year you have used troops in attacking Che-li and in frequently invading and plundering Ba-bai. You have also relied on your strength to attack Burma and Jia-li. They are small states and their people few and now you have taken them. As for China, its territory extends to the yi in the four directions, and its lands adjoin the territories of the various chieftains and headmen. However, I have never taken advantage of my strength to oppress or bully them or to eliminate their heirs…”

“…You errant fools in Lu-chuan first, without authority, mobilized troops for a campaign against Jin-chi, then made plans to seize Jing-dong and subsequently pillaged Ding-bian. Reason would have permitted me to despatch troops to punish you, but I did not take up this option and did not contest with you. I have not forced you into becoming an obedient state and have allowed you to follow your own devices. This has been so for several years. Recently, I have heard that you have foolishly aggressed against your neighbouring states, with the intention of expanding your territory and illegally gaining more people. Also, you plan to attack our South-west. Verily, this cannot be permitted!”

“The ancient Chinese sages said: `The rivers and mountains, land, territory and the people all inhere in the Imperial throne. They are not things man can possess by force. They can be acquired only through Heaven's bestowal.' You, Si Lun-fa have not maintained good relations with your neighbours, and instead have sent troops in three directions, stupidly annexing other states. Such is your greed and your plotting. The states surrounding Lu-chuan have, from ancient times until now, all had their own rulers. They have never been united. Even if I am unable to stop you acting as you wish, the Way of Heaven will surely achieve that end. However, if you respond in a sensible way, you may still come out alright. But I now warn you to content yourself with what you have at present. If you are not satisfied with what you have at present and move to take more, then you will either lose everything or perish. Thus, would it not be best to just look after that which you have at present?" (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

According to the Ming Annals, on hearing the orders, Si Lun-fa was frightened and quickly agreed to withdraw his troops. At about this time one of Si Lun-fa’s subordinate chiefs Dao Gan-meng rebelled. Si Lun-fa believed that he could use the envoy from the Ming court, Si-cong, to force their submission, so he wouldn’t let him leave and presented him with elephants, horses, gold and precious stones as presents, but Si-cong refused the gifts, rebuffed Si Lun-fa, and asked to be released:

"China does not consider elephants, horses, gold and jade as valuables; what it values is only loyal subjects, noble statesmen, strong soldiers, gallant generals, filial sons and obedient grandsons. You should send us envoys back to the Court and in future should not engage in raiding and trouble-making. Thus will you be showing your spirit as a loyal prince" (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

Si Lun-fa invited Si-cong to a feast and afterwards had them escorted to the border. On his return to the capital, the Emperor was impressed with the work of the envoys and presented them with gifts as a token of his esteem (MSL 11 Mar 1396).

Si Lun-fa deposed by a rival Tai leader (1397)

A year before the first Ming emperor died in 1398, the Tai-Yunnan frontier descends into chaos. After the Ming envoys return to the capital, Si Lun-fa welcomes more outsiders into his domains and his control over the frontier erodes even further. First, he plays host to itinerant Buddhist monks:

“Initially, the people in Ping-mian did not believe in Buddhism. A monk went there from Yun-nan and spoke well about the effects of one's actions in successive lives [karma] . Si Lun-fa placed great trust in his words” (MSL 10 Oct 1397).

Next, fascinated by their mastery over military technologies, Si Lun-fa plays host to renegade Chinese soldiers:

“Also some border troops from Jin-chi fled to his territory. They were familiar with cannons (火砲) and guns (火銃). Si Lun-fa was pleased with their abilities. Thus he gave them gold belts and, with the monk, placed them above the various tribes” (MSL 10 Oct 1397).

Welcoming outsiders and giving them higher status than members of his own court like this, led to enmity and fissions among the Tai leaders surrounding him. In the face of his decreasing power, Si Lun-fa was forced to flee and seek Chinese protection. Dao Gan-meng was the leader of the faction that eventually seized power:

“Dao Gan-meng hated them [the outsiders] and thus, together with his subordinates, rebelled. He then led his troops to attack Teng-chong Prefecture. Si Lun-fa, afraid of Gan-meng's power, fled to Yun-nan and the Xi-ping Marquis Mu Chun sent him to the [Ming] capital” (MSL 10 Oct 1397).

When Si Lun-fa arrived at the Ming capital, the emperor sympathized with him and made military appointments to support him against Dao Gan-meng. The emperor was concerned that the proper steps be taken to thwart the power of Dao Gan-meng:

"A guard will be established at Teng-chong to monitor the situation. Wei-yuan and Yuan-gan have already come to the allegiance of the Court and other places are heeding orders. Thus, the force of Dao Gan-meng's rebellion is growing increasingly less and an increasing number of his supporters are coming to allegiance. Your return to your country can only be a matter of days. However, if the advance is made without caution and Dao Gan-meng's power is still substantial, his supporters in the country will not dare oppose him. Then the territory will never be yours” (MSL 14 Dec 1397)

Si Lun-fa was finally sent back to Yunnan with “one hundred liang of gold, 150 liang of silver and 500 ding of paper money” and a good upbraiding from the emperor. The emperor invokes the natural order once again in his words of admonition as he sends Si Lun-fa on his journey:

"In ancient times, there was a saying: `Find pleasure in that which the people find pleasure in, and hate that which the people hate.' This was said to those who look after the people, and meant that where the people's hearts lie, there also lie the principles of Heaven. Those who are good at ruling the people must seek the people's feelings. Now you, Si Lun-fa, are head of the region of Ping-mian. However, you became divorced from the likes and dislikes of the people. The people under you could not tolerate this and thus you fled to us. I know that your ancestors benefitted the people for generations and thus the people appointed you. However, when you lost the people's support, you turned your back on your country and your ancestor's graves, left your relatives and came here. If you long remain here and do not return, the territory will no longer be yours. However, you must recognize that right and wrong are always clear and Heaven's punishment is always correct. Generals have been sent to punish the crimes of Dao Gan-meng and thus I am ordering you to return to your old state" (MSL 15 Jan 1398).

Blamed for not looking out for the interests of his people, Si Lun-fa seems more the victim of a “unite [under one leader] and conquer” strategy than the “divide and conquer” strategy that historians usually claim to have been the most important strategy used in outside rule (Burmese, Chinese) over Tai socieities. In hindsight, the interests of the Ming emperor and Si Lun-fa’s Tai subjects were irreconcilable and pressed in these two opposing directions, Si Lun-fa met his downfall. Ironically, his loyalty to the Ming emperor sorely tested his allegiance to his own people.

Instructions were also given to a Chinese official, the Xi-ping Marquis Mu Chun to escort Si Lun-fa back to Yunnan and to support him militarily. Nowadays, we might call such an attempt to support the rule of a ruler who had lost his legitimacy, a puppet government.

Dao Gan-meng was quick to seek legitimacy from the Ming. He sent an envoy to Mu Chun requesting permission to offer tribute and before a reply was even received, the rebel leader “sent people with local products and requested that he be appointed as native official. He was then attacked by Dao De-nong of Da-dian. As he was unable to withstand the attack, he sent advice and sought permission to send a memorial to the Court. Chun allowed this” (MSL 15 Jan 1398). Dao Gan-meng’s power was short-lived, already challenged by other Tai leader’s in Si Lun-fa’s clan:

“Hu-du of Si Lun-fa's tribe, has occupied Teng-chong and Nu-jiang, as well as Jing-dong, Yi-wai and Wei-yuan, and all these places have inclined to culture and allied themselves with the Court. Dao Gan-meng is afraid of being attacked and he wants to use the Court's might to repel Hu-du. His claimed desire to come and offer tribute should not, I fear, be too readily believed. The troops which we were ordered to assemble now await deployment" (MSL 11 Mar 1398 - a ).

The emperor, once again interpreted Tai military actions in terms of deceit, rather than an inherent feature of a Tai segmentary state system lacking central-unified order and was willing to allow Dao Gan-ming to submit and offer tribute, if he did so in good faith and followed Chinese traditions in the matter:

"The distant yi are indeed guileful and deceitful. However, I am leniently allowing the request to see if he will change. Those routes occupied by Hu-du you should pacify and instruct as the situations dictate. If Dao Gan-ming is being deceitful, you should make careful preparations and then punish him. Do not lose the opportunity." (MSL 11 Mar 1398).

The reinstatement of Si Lun-fa (1398)

Mu Chun provided a military escort for Si Lun-fa back to Yunnan. Mu Chun stayed with Si Lun-fa in Jinchi and sent a force of 5,000 to attack Dao Gan-meng:

“Fu and so on crossed the Gao-liang-gong Mountains and directly attacked Nan Dian, greatly destroying it and killing the chieftain Dao Ming-meng, and killing or capturing a large number of people. They then took the troops back to attack Jing-han Stockade, but the stockade, relying on its high and dangerous location, held out and did not fall. As the government troops' grain and weapons were nearly depleted and the bandits' strength was growing, he sent a messenger to urgently advise Chun of the emergency.”

“Chun led 500 cavalrymen to relieve them. Taking advantage of the night, they moved to Nu-jiang and the following morning proceeded directly there. He ordered the cavalrymen to gallop to below the stockade and raise dust to scare them. The bandits in their high position saw the dust clouds rising to Heaven and, having not expected the troops of the Great Army to arrive, were greatly shocked and frightened. Thus, they led their troops in surrender. Chun took advantage of the victory to also attack Kong-dong Stockade. The bandits there fled by night” (11 Mar 1398 – b).

Mu Chun died of an illness and the official who replaced him (He Fu) was able to capture Dao Gan-meng and install Si Lun-fa as the ruler once again, however Si Lun-fa died a year later. No cause for his death is given.

In 1399 the ruler of Burmese Ava, Minkyiswasawke, placed an inscription in Toungoo “commemorating his reunification of Burma and saving the country from destruction and invasion” (Bennett, L. 795, B. II, pp. 958-59, cited in p. 25, “L” meaning Duroiselle’s list of inscriptions and “B” meaning “Inscriptions copied from the stones collected by King Bodawpaya”).

At the death of the founding Ming emperor in 1398 the Ming empire was racked by a succession struggle and political instability that was only resolved in 1402 with the accession of the Yung-le emperor (Cambridge History of China, v. 7, Ming Dynasty, pp. 184-204). The expansionist warfare of this emperor into northern Vietnam adjacent to Yunnan would change the historical trajectory of the Tai-Yunnan frontier and Burmese Ava once again.

After almost 20 years of failure in their governance over the Tai-Yunnan frontier officials at the Ming court must have had second thoughts about raising one Tai leader over all the others, so they partitioned the territory of Si Lun-fa’s Luchuan into three pieces which were to become known as the the “three fu’s”: Meng Yang [Mong Yang], Mu Bang [Hsenwi], and Meng Ting. Four smaller Chieftain Commissions, Lujiang, Ganyai, Dahou, and Wandian, were also established under the Jinchi garrison (Sun Lai Chen dissertation, p. 233 citing Jiang Yingliang, Daizu Shi, p. 244 and Chen Yi-sein, “Mingchu de Zhong Mian guanxi," 2 (1969): 15, 20; Liew Foon Ming, 1996, p. 165, footnote 11).